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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
~-,LORA S. ~lEClL-\~1, et al, I 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
ARTHUR R. ALLEN, J. H. ALLEN, )' 
et al, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
7865 
APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR RE-HEARING 
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
COMES NOW, ARTHUR R. ALLEN and J. H. 
ALLEN, appellants herein and respectfully petition the 
Honorable Court for a re-hearing and re-argument in 
the above entitled action. This Petition is based on the 
grounds that this Honorable Court erred in its finding 
that the Trial Court's Instruction Number 11, though 
clearly erroneous, was not prejudicial error, such ruling 
being contrary to the holding of this court in Ryan vs. 
Union Pacific Railway Company, 46 Utah 530, 151 P. 
71, and such ruling ignoring the presumption that such 
an error in instructions is prejudicial. 
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WHEREFORE, Appellants, Petitioners, herein, 
pray that the judgment of the Court be re-examined and 
a re-hearing and re-argument be permitted of the above 
entitled case. A Brief in support of this Petition is filed 
herewith. 
_________ ]JJM.W_,~-~-------------
PETER W. BILLINGS 
Attorney for Appellants and 
Petitioners 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
PETER W. BILLINGS, hereby certifies that he is 
one of the Attorneys for the Appellants and Petitioners 
herein, that he is familiar with the facts and issues raised 
on the Appeal and the issues raised by the foregoing 
Petition for re-hearing and further certifies that in his 
opinion there is good cause to believe that the decision 
objected to is erroneous and that the case ought to be 
re-examined and re-argued as prayed for in said Peti-
tion and that said Petition is filed in good faith and not 
for the purpose of delay. 
Dated this ---------~=>-:::~~~~-~~;;:::.:.~~---···· 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR RE-HEARING 
The facts are stated fully in Appellants' Brief on 
Appeal. One of the issues raised in such brief was the 
error of the trial court in instructing the jury as to the 
presumption of due care on the part of the decedent, 
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Thmnas Udell .l\lechan1. 'fhe opinion of the court agrees 
with Appellants' contention that such instruction was 
erroneous but a majority of the court felt that it was 
not prejudicial without citing or referring to Ryan vs. 
Union Pacific Railzcay Company, supra, which had pre-
viously held such an instruction to be clearly prejudicial 
and without following the well-established rule that such 
an error in an instructi?n is presumed to be prejudicial. 
For those reasons, it is submitted that this court 
should grant the Petition for re-hearing, to re-consider 
its opinion and hear further argument on the issue of 
presumption of due care on the part of the decedent. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE ERRORS IN INSTRUCTION NO. 11 ARE PRE-
SUMED TO BE PREJUDICIAL. 
II. THE ERRORS IN INSTRUCTION NO. 11 WERE 
CLEARLY PREJUDICIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ERRORS IN INSTRUCTION NO. 11 ARE PRE-
SUMED TO BE PREJUDICIAL. 
It is a long established principle of judicial review 
that an erroneous charge to the jury is error which is 
calculated to do harm and in such case, prejudice will 
be presumed until, by the record, it is shown that error 
was not or could not have been harmful; Littledyke vs. 
Wood, 69 Utah 323, 255 P 172, and an instruction which 
is equivocable and capable of being interpreted correctly 
or incorrectly, will be deemed prejudicial until, by the 
record, it is demonstrated that it would or could have 
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done no harm. Grow vs. Oregon Short Litne, 47 Utah 26, 
150 P 970. Thus, as said by this court in Jenson vs. Utah 
Railway Co., 72 Utah 366,270 P 349 at page .362: 
"However, where the committed error is of 
such nature or character as calculated to do harm, 
or on its face as having the natural tendency to do 
so, prejudice will be presun1ed, until by the record 
it is affirmatively shown that the error was not 
or could not have been of harmful effect. 'l1hus, 
if the appellant shows committed error of such 
nature or character, he, in the first instance, has 
made a prima facie showing of prejudice. 'rhe 
burden, or rather the duty of going forward, is 
then cast on the respondent to show by the record 
that the con1mitted error was not, or could not 
have been, of harmful effect. State v. Cluff, 48 
Utah 102, 158 P. 701; Jackson, Stone, et al. v. 
~-,eather River & Gibsonville Water Co., 14 Cal. 
19; Thelin v. Stewart, 100 Cal. 372, 34 P. 861; 2 
Hayne, New rr,rial and Appeal (2d Ed.) pp. 1608-
1614." 
It is submitted that there is nothing in this record 
which can meet that presumption, but on the contrary, 
the nature of the erroneous instruction and the issue 
which it points up, clearly reinforce the presumption that 
the error was prejudicial. 
A.s stated by this court in the recent case of State 
v. Hendricks, 258 P 2d 452 : 
"1,he fact that elsewhere in the instructions 
the jury were correctly instructed on the pre-
sumption of innocence does not cure the instant 
error. Although the instructions are to be con-
sidered as a whole, where they are in irreconcil-
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II. THE ERRORS IN INSTRUCrl'ION NO. 11 WERE 
CLEARLY PREJUDICIAL. 
This is the second case in two years in which this 
court has found the giving of an instruction concerning 
the presumption of due care on the part of a decedent 
in a wrongful death case to be error. See Tuttle vs. 
P.l.E., 242 P 2d 764. This is also the second time in two 
years that this court has held that such error is not 
prejudicial. With such judicial backing it will now be 
standard operating procedure for attorneys in wrongful 
death cases to submit and get such an instruction. So a 
jury in such a case will have effectively eleminated from 
the possibilities before it, in a close case as to the cause 
of an accident, the conclusion that neither party was to 
blame, see, e.g., Gibbs vs. Blue Cab, 249 P 2d 213, as the 
presumption will be riding in the car with the plaintiff; 
so that instead of the plaintiff having to prove that the 
accident was due to the negligence of the defendant, the 
defendant will have to prove that the accident was due to 
the contributory negligence or sole negligence of the 
plaintiff's decedent. With the presumption before the 
jury, the dead center "out" afforded by our common law 
rules of placing the burden of persuasion on the plain-
tiff is gone. 
In Tuttle vs. P.l.E., supra, the giving of the instruc., 
tion as to the presumption was not deemed prejudicial 
as it merely stated to the jury that, in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, the presumption of due care 
on the part of the decedent exists and, although there 
was such evidence to the contrary, the jury was deemed 
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intelligent enough to realize that it was mere surplusage 
and to look at the "blanket" rather than the "handker-
chief". In the case at bar the opinion of the court has 
stated: "It was error for the court to instruct the jury 
on that question * * * If the instructionon the pre-
sumption accurately stated the law and the jury cor-
rectly understood it there could be no prejudice. But 
here there were a number of incorrect statements of the 
law on presumptions and so we n1ust analyze them to 
detennine whether defendants were prejudiced thereby." 
We submit that the opinion of the court is correct in 
stating that there were a number of erroneous statements 
of law in the instruction, but that the court is engaging 
in sheer speculation and perhaps wishful thinking in 
concluding that the jury correctly understood the instruc-
tion even though it incorrectly stated the law. 
The first error in the instruction was the use of the 
phrase "Until the contrary is proven." The opinion of 
the court recognizes that the jury might well have under-
stood the phrase to mean that this placed on the defend-
ant the burden of persuasion that decedent Mecham was 
negligent which negligence proximately caused the acci-
dent, but argues that this is not prejudicial as defendant 
had the burden of proof of contributory negligence in 
any event. That is true, but that argument overlooks 
the fact that plaintiff is supposed to have the burden of 
proving that the accident was caused by the negligence 
of defendant and of over-coming the middle ground of 
"neither to blame." Defendants normally need not have 
to prove negligence of the plaintiff to escape liability, 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
but here the jury is told that the decedent is presumed 
not to be negligent until the contrary is proven, so that 
defendant starts with the scales tilted in the direction 
of his responsibility. 
This raises the second basic error of the instruction 
in the case at bar. The jury was told the presumption 
was to be considered with all the other facts in evidence 
in determining whether the decedent was negligent. So 
that in addition to starting with a presumption that the 
decedent is not negligent, which as the opinion of the 
court admits is not the law, the defendant ends up with 
the scale still tilted by that imponderable presumption. 
'fhere is no question but that there was sufficient evi-
dence from which the jury could reasonably have found 
that Thomas Mecham was negligent and his negligence 
contributed to or caused the fatal accident. It is a close 
case as to which car was on the wrong side of the center 
line or whether both were over the line. How can this 
court, or counsel for either party, at this time, speculate 
whether the presence of that imponderable presumption 
in weighing the evidence tipped the scales in favor of the 
plaintiff or whether the jury ~erely understood that 
the trial court was commenting on the evidence or the 
evidentiary value of man's instinct for self preservation. 
And if it be considered as mere comment on the 
evidentiary value of man's instinct, that alone is preju-
dicial error. State vs. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P 2d 177. 
The opinion of the court, while giving lip service to the 
approach of Professor Morgan in his comments on the 
"Model Code of Evidence" and his law review articles 
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on the subject of presumptions, by holding this instruc-
tion to be not prejudicial effectively nullifies Morgan's 
approach as to the purpose of presumptions and over-
rules, without even lip service, the case of Ryan vs. U.P. 
Bailway Comparny, 46 Utah 530, 151 P 71, cited in Appel-
lant's brief. In the Ryan case this court held to be 
prejudicial error an instruction in a death case reading 
as follows: 
"You are instructed that the instinct of self 
preservation and the disposition of men to avoid 
personal harm reenforce an inference that a per-
son killed or injured was in the exercise of ordi-
nary care, and that the natural instinct which 
leads men in their sober senses to avoid injury 
and preserve life is an element of evidence to be 
considered in connection with the other testimony 
in this case." 
In that case the word "presumption" and all the infer-
ences it conjures in the lay mind as well as the confusion 
it has wrought in legal circles was not even used. Cer-
tainly, if that instruction is prejudicial error without 
even the bad word "presumption", as this court held, the 
instruction in the case at bar is more, not less prejudicial. 
If Ryan vs. U.P. Railway Co., supra, and In reNew-
ell's Estate, 78 Utah 463, 5 P 2d 230, are to be reversed 
and defendants in wrongful death cases are to be saddled 
with the job of righting the scales tipped in favor of the 
plaintiff by a presumption that the decedent was acting 
in due care and with the task of meeting an instruction 
to the jury that it is to consider that presumption that 
decedents act carefully but survivors do not in arriving 
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at a verdict as to causation, it is respectfully requested 
that those cases be reversed in the full light of day and 
not ignored by the shadow of "error but no harm done." 
If the instruction ratified by this court in its opinion 
be submitted in a case where the alleged wrongdoer is 
a decedent, as now authorized by Chapter 30, Laws of 
Utah 1953, will not surviving plaintiffs be clamouring 
that they have to prove not only by a preponderance of 
evidence that the decedent was negligent, but overcome 
an ever-present presumption that he was not 1 It is sub-
mitted that no matter how carefully a court may delineate 
to a jury the respective burdens which the law imposes 
upon plaintiffs and defendants as to negligence, causa-
tion and contributory negligence, to load the charge with 
a "presumption" which the jury shall consider along 
with the evidence, not only confuses the jury, but creates 
an inference in the jury's mind that the court, while try-
ing to state fairly the obligations and burdens of proof 
which each party has to meet, really thinks that the one 
in whose favor the court gives that presumption is the 
one who is in the right and that the jury had better think 
so too. 
Attorneys and judges do not serve on juries and 
can only speculate as to what goes on in jurors' minds 
in considering the legal "mumbo jumbo" of the multitude 
of instructions which are handed to them. But it is sub-
mitted that it is grievous error to let a party's rights, 
duties and obligations rest on speculation whether the 
jury properly understand an instruction which even 
lawyers and learned judges have difficulty in construing. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that it is hardly harmless error to a 
farmer who, as the record shows, must bear this judg-
ment out of his own pocket and lose his life's accumula-
tions, to be told that a jury rendered a verdict against 
him of $45,000.00, based on an erroneous instruction as 
to the law. If our faith in the jury system is to be main-
tained, it must rest in the belief that the jury will be 
led down the correct path of the law and not left to sort 
out the proper law from a mixture of clearly erroneous 
instructions. If there is to be any presumption indulged 
in on the basis of man's experience, it would be that a 
jury of laymen would be unable to do so. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PETER W. BILLINGS, 
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